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INTRODUCTION
"[Racial c]ommunities are not all created equal."1 Yet, the
established environmental justice framework tends to treat ra-
cial minorities as interchangeable and to assume for all com-
munities of color that health and distribution of environmental
burdens are main concerns. For some racialized communities,2
however, environmental justice is not only, or even primarily,
about immediate health concerns or burden distribution.
Rather, for them, and particularly for some indigenous peoples,
environmental justice is mainly about cultural and economic
self-determination and belief systems that connect their his-
tory, spirituality, and livelihood to the natural environment. 3
This article explores the meaning of "environmental jus-
tice," focusing on race as it merges with the environment. The
word "environment" triggers images of the physical surround-
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1. Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environ-
mental Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 15 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
2. See Part IV infra for a discussion of the process of "racialization."
3. As explained in Part III, infra, indigenous peoples' identity in the United
States is sometimes treated as a political identity (defining government-to-
government relationships) and at other times treated as a racial identity (in
popular understandings and sometimes in law). The concept of differential ra-
cialization, developed in Part IV, infra, offers analytical tools for addressing these
shifting characterizations.
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ings-water, trees, ecosystems.4  Society tends to separate
physical environment from social environment-the latter in-
cluding people, culture, and social structures.5 But the "race"
in "environmental racism" suggests that the physical and the
social are integrally connected. Indeed, understanding "our
environment" is impossible without understanding both its
physical and social aspects, and their interplay.6 Much of the
scholarly writing on environmental justice does not address
with adequate complexity or depth the interplay between the
natural and the racial.
Rather, many articles make unexplored assumptions about
racialized environments, failing to inquire into distinct cultural
and power differences among communities of color and their
relationships to "the environment." For instance, while some
might describe the siting of a waste disposal plan near an in-
digenous American community as environmental racism, that
community might say that the wrong is not racial discrimina-
tion or unequal treatment; it is the denial of group sover-
eignty-the control over land and resources for the cultural and
spiritual well-being of a people. Alternatively, the community
might say that the siting is, on balance, desirable because it
provides needed jobs in the area and is an aspect of group eco-
nomic survival.
This article examines assumptions and misassumptions
about racialized environments. It also suggests that to build
strong alliances and address contemporary environmental in-
justice in concrete situations, scholars, lawyers, and activists
must treat racial and indigenous7 communities and their rela-
tionships to "the environment" with greater complexity. That
means grappling with racial and cultural differences, under-
standing the often unacknowledged role of whiteness in envi-
ronmental law and policy, and, in sum, rebuilding the estab-
lished environmental justice framework itself.
The early environmental justice movement, with its com-
munity organizing, scholarly writing, lobbying, and litigating
produced some substantial gains for communities of color.'
4. See infra Part I.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. For a discussion of differences between racial and indigenous communi-
ties see infra Part I.
8. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE 1 (1990).
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Those who developed theory and fought on the community
frontlines deserve considerable credit for their achievements.
We submit, however, that in present-day America, character-
ized in many locales by a "retreat from racial justice,"9 original
understandings of and initial approaches to environmental ra-
cism need to be rethought.
Accordingly, this article is divided into five parts. Part I
describes the established environmental justice framework
generated by much of the scholarly writing and the
misassumptions it tends to make about health, distributive jus-
tice, culture, and race. Part II explores Native American legal
scholars' more contextual approaches and their implications for
environmental justice. Part III offers insight into the evolving
environmental justice movement by using critical sociological
and race theories to explain how groups acquire different iden-
tities, status, and power and develop or sustain differing cul-
tures and relationships to the physical environment. We call
this "racializing environmental justice."I°
Part IV employs this approach to environmental justice in
order to explore one particular racialized environmental con-
troversy: a water controversy in Hawai'i that illustrates the
need for scholars, activists, lawyers, and community leaders to
integrate community history, racial and political identities, and
socio-economic and cultural needs in defining environmental
problems and in fashioning remedies. Finally, the article con-
cludes with a suggestion: that by treating each racialized com-
munity with greater complexity, according to its specific cul-
tural values, racialized history, socio-economic power, and
group needs and goals, we move from a universalized, overly-
broad environment/racism paradigm to a more integrated par-
ticularized approach to racialized environmental justice.
9. See STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL
JUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY (1995).
10. The term "racializing environmental justice" was used by Eric Yama-
moto at the joint session of the Environmental, Civil Rights, and Native American
sections of the American Association of Law Schools, Annual Conference, on
January 6, 1996. See audio tape of Environmental Justice held by the American
Association of Law Schools (Jan. 6-8, 1996) (on file with author).
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I. THE ESTABLISHED ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FRAMEWORK
The environmental movement traditionally focused on wil-
derness and wildlife preservation, pollution abatement, popula-
tion control, and resource conservation." Building upon main-
stream environmentalism is a movement initiated by
environmental and racial justice groups in response to the in-
equitable distribution of environmental burdens, particularly
burdens assumed by poorer communities of color. 2 This
movement, environmental justice, responds to "environmental
racism" by combining environmentalism with civil rights.'"
Environmental justice, with its social and legal dimensions, is
also a "critique of traditional views of environmentalism, sci-
ence, and social policy."' 4
Most scholarly writing on environmental justice tackles
two tasks: (1) identifying the roots of environmental degrada-
tion with disproportionate impacts on racial minorities, and (2)
11. See BULLARD, supra note 8.
12. The environmental justice movement also includes claims by residents of
poor communities. Studies show, however, that inequities in the distribution of
environmental harms among poor communities also have a direct correlation to
race. Thus, this article will focus on environmental justice claims by communities
of color. See James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental
Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 126,
126 n.3 (1994); see also Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992)
(discussing environmental poverty issues separate from environmental race is-
sues); Valerie P. Mahoney, Note, Environmental Justice: From Partial Victories to
Complete Solutions, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 369 (1999) (citing several studies
that support the proposition that race and income are directly correlated with the
inequitable siting of hazardous waste facilities).
13. See generally Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Environ-
mental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 748 (1993) (discussing the current envi-
ronmental justice movement as a convergence of the environmental movement
and the civil rights movement); R. Gregory Roberts, Comment, Environmental
Justice and Community Empowerment: Learning From the Civil Rights Move-
ment, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 229 (1998) (tracking the parallels between the civil rights
and the environmental justice movements, discussing the integration of civil
rights and environmental laws and concluding that community empowerment
strategies are most effective for achieving environmental justice).
14. Charles Lee, Developing the Vision of Environmental Justice: A Para-
digm for Achieving Healthy and Sustainable Communities, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
571, 571 (1995). Environmental justice advocates "have employed a wide variety
of legal strategies including federal and state environmental laws, common law
tort claims, constitutional challenges, and civil rights laws." Julia B. Latham
Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: Can a Legal
Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 638 (2000).
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developing solutions for redistributing environmental burdens.
As a consequence, the established environmental justice
framework conceptualizes environmental racism in terms of
the siting of hazards and related health problems, focuses on
the decisionmaking process underlying siting problems, and
endeavors to remedy the harms of disproportionate siting. This
part examines the established environmental justice frame-
work and finds considerable benefit to racial and indigenous
communities in certain situations.5 It then suggests that the
framework is limited because it sometimes makes misassump-
tions about race and fails to develop approaches to environ-
mental racism that account for cultural, power, and goal differ-
ences among racial and indigenous communities that extend
beyond health and the distributional concerns. The next part
explores Native American legal scholars' departure from this
environmental justice framework and their attempts, which
are in some respects still limited, to develop a more integrated
discourse by approaching environmental justice with greater
cultural and historical depth.
A. Characteristics
"To achieve justice, we must understand the roots of injustice." 16
The roots of environmental injustice lie in what the Rever-
end Benjamin Chavis termed "environmental racism." 7 Envi-
ronmental racism is described as the "nationwide phenome-
15. Although indigenous groups in the United States are racialized, they are
also externally recognized, and often internally define themselves as "political"
minorities-a quasi-sovereign status rather than a racial one. See Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 697 n.16 (1989); see
also infra Part IV.
16. Michael Gelobter, The Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 841, 842 (1994).
17. The Reverend Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., first coined the term "environ-
mental racism" in a study by the Commission for Racial Justice of the United
Church of Christ. See Adam Swartz, Environment Justice: A Survey of the Ail-
ments of Environmental Racism, 2 HOW. SCROLL 35, 35 (1993) (citing
COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE OF THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, ToxIc
WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES ix-x (1987)); see also Gerald Torres, In-
troduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 COLO. L. REV. 839 (1992).
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non""8 that occurs when "any policy, practice, or directive...
differentially impacts or disadvantages [whether intended or
unintended] individuals, groups, or communities based on race
or color."' 9 For most scholars, this "differential effect," meas-
ured against white communities, results in the unfair distribu-
tion of environmental hazards. The established environmental
justice framework addresses this problem of environmental ra-
cism and seeks to achieve healthy and sustainable communi-
ties.2 °
This vision of environmental justice has four general char-
acteristics. First, it focuses on traditional environmental haz-
ards such as waste facilities and resulting pollution. As one
scholar observes: "[a]t the crossroads where race and environ-
ment meet, the most fundamental problem ... is pollution."21
Environmental justice advocates assert that "all Americans
have a basic right to live and work in healthy environments."22
Much of the literature on the subject examines the causal rela-
tionship between pollution arising from hazardous waste facili-
ties, for instance, and the increased incidence of negative
health effects in people of color.23 A key component in the envi-
ronmental justice framework, therefore, concentrates on re-
ducing the threat of health hazards to people of color and "im-
prov[ing] their quality of life by making their communities safe
from toxic chemicals, without sacrificing resources for future
18. Edward Patrick Boyle, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Ra-
cism, Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analy-
sis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937, 967 (1993).
19. Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 289-90 (1995) (quoting Robert D. Bul-
lard, Environmental Equity: Examining the Evidence of Environmental Racism,
LAND USE F., Winter 1993, at 6). But see Daniel Kevin, "Environmental Racism"
and Locally Undesirable Land Uses: A Critique of Environmental Justice Theories
and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 138-39 (1997) (arguing disproportionate
siting is usually determined by non-racial factors, including physical geography,
expense, proximity to other facilities and transportation routes, and local opposi-
tion).
20. See Fisher, supra note 19, at 289-90.
21. Charles J. McDermott, Balancing the Scales of Environmental Justice,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 689, 690 (1994). The characteristics described in this part
reflect broad generalizations gleaned from the literature and are not an agreed-
upon list of environmental justice attributes.
22. Mariaea Ramirez Fisher, On the Road from Environmental Racism to
Environmental Justice, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 450 (1994).
23. See, e.g., Bunyan Bryant, Pollution Prevention and Participatory Re-
search as a Methodology for Environmental Justice, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589 (1995).
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generations."24  Thus, for some, and perhaps most, environ-
mental justice scholars, "quality-of-life issues 2s are connected
to pollution prevention and resource control measures that "are
desirable for all people, no matter what their race."26
Second, and closely related, the environmental justice
framework focuses on the disproportionate distribution of haz-
ardous facilities and on the re-siting of those facilities. Its aim
is to rectify the injustice of disproportionate siting. Its empha-
sis on physical facilities location stresses narrow scientific as-
sessments about pollution levels and limits and statistical cal-
culations about population numbers and facility distances.
This emphasis on physical proximity is related to, yet distinct
from, what is sometimes called environmental equity,27 or dis-
tributive justice. Distributive justice asks "whether there is a
'morally proper distribution of social benefits and burdens
among society's members."'28 Indeed, in 1993, Richard Lazarus
observed that environmental policymakers were ignoring the
effects and sources of racism because "[c]onsideration of dis-
tributional consequences was characterized as raising 'social'
issues that had little to do with the kinds of 'technical' and 'sci-
entific' judgments considered central to the establishment of
environmental protection programs."29
24. Id. at 594.
25. See id. at 598.
26. McDermott, supra note 21, at 698.
27. See H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (1994.) (dis-
cussing the concept and meaning of equity and society's distributive problems);
Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated
Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 13 (2000)
(examining the cultural harm to Native American fishing practices caused by cur-
rent agency practice regarding environmental hazards).
28. Sheila Foster, Justice From the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities,
Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Jus-
tice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 790 (1998) (quoting IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE
AND THE POLITICS OF DEFERENCE 5 (1990)).
29. Richard J. Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environmental Jus-
tice, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 2 (1994). Some take a broad "social jus-
tice view." Catherine O'Neill observed that for Native Americans and environ-
mental justice, "current agency practice is deeply troubling as a matter of
distributive justice." O'Neill, supra note 27, at 13. O'Neill also noted that
"[a]lthough distributive justice is one facet of environmental justice, advocates
point out that achieving equal distribution of environmental harms is not coex-
tensive with achieving environmental justice." Id. at 14 n.26. See also Ora Fred
Harris, Jr., Environmental Justice: The Path to a Remedy That Hits the Mark, 21
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 797, 797 (1999) (describing the environmental jus-
tice movement's dismissive attitude for social justice concerns).
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The 1992 Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") re-
port on "Environmental Equity" recognized racism, along with
class status, as underlying explanations of skewed distribution
of burdens.3" It nevertheless limited its remedial actions to
"inequities based on scientific data" that are "measurable and
quantifiable."31 By emphasizing "scientific data" in defining
problems and fashioning remedies, the established environ-
mental justice framework generally has focused on the physical
location and relocation of polluting facilities, and not on the so-
cial and cultural effects for racial communities.
Third, the established environmental justice framework
seeks to ensure that communities of color have equal represen-
tation in the administration of environmental laws and poli-
32cies. Environmental justice advocates assert that people of
color are prime targets for both private and public environ-
mental abuses because of their inability to mobilize effectively
against the government and business policies that adversely
affect their communities.33 Environmental justice scholars at-
tribute this "deficiency" to the shortage of political power in
communities of color.34 Political powerlessness ranges from the
failure of people of color to exercise their elective votes to the
under-representation of people of color in government, law, and
business.35 Consequently, people of color have been largely un-
der-represented on environmental issues in legislative, regula-
tory, and enforcement arenas. Environmental justice attempts
to level the playing field in these arenas by opening communi-
30. Environmental Equity Workgroup, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA
230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES,
WORKGROUP REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR 10 (1992).
31. Id.
32. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice For All: It's the Right
Thing to Do, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 281, 286 (1994).
33. See Peggy M. Shepard, Issues of Community Empowerment, 21
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739, 739 (1994).
34. See Swartz, supra note 17, at 42; see also Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant,
Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 163, 164 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992)
(listing as a cause of disparity the "lack of local opposition to the facility, often re-
sulting from minorities' lack of organization and political resources"); Bullard, su-
pra note 1, at 23 ("[Slocial inequality and imbalances of social power are at the
heart of environmental degradation.... ."); Mahoney, supra note 12, at 368 (not-
ing that poor and minority communities lack "any real political power" and there-
fore "suffer from inadequate representation, both in the membership of main-
stream environmental organizations and in national government positions").
35. See Fisher, supra note 22, at 461; Mahoney, supra note 12, at 368.
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cations between environmental and minority groups and im-
proving minority group access to legislative, administrative,
and judicial fora.
Fourth, environmental justice framework emphasizes "a
community-based movement to bring pressure on the person or
agency with decisionmaking authority."36 By building "people
power,"37 environmental justice is a "crucial aspect of improv-
ing the quality of life in many communities of color,"" empow-
ering community members to participate in collective efforts to
solve common problems and to assert greater control over deci-
sions which affect their lives. 9
Two different models describe this "empowering" role of lo-
cal communities in environmental decisions. ° In response to
growing concern that "regulatory agencies might develop a bias
in favor of the organized interests of the regulated," 1 environ-
mental justice advocates advance a pluralist model of deci-
sionmaking. Based on utilitarianism, the pluralist model holds
that "all participants are equally qualified to participate in de-
cisions [and so] preferences of the participants stand on sub-
stantively equal footing."42 The pluralist model further main-
tains that public participation is necessary to guard against
agency bias and to help the agency understand the claims of all
interested groups and to mediate among them.43 In the late
1980s, however, this model of participation received sharp
criticism for having "no orientation toward the public interest
or common good, [and focusing on] 'just private interests in ag-
36. Mahoney, supra note 12, at 368; see also Harris, supra note 29, at 805
(endorsing a remedial scheme utilizing "cooperation, not litigation, along with the
political empowerment of those who disproportionately bear the burdens of envi-
ronmental hazards").
37. See Environmental Equity Workgroup, supra note 30, at 661.
38. Shepard, supra note 33, at 740.
39. See id.; see also Roberts, supra note 13, at 263-69 (arguing that commu-
nity empowerment strategies, with their focus on the gradual building of a move-
ment ultimately capable of exerting pressure on those with decisionmaking
authority are the most effective tool towards achieving environmental justice).
40. See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participa-
tion and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 17 (1998). Gauna also
offers a third model, the expertise model. This model relies on empiricism and
science to solve environmental problems. See id.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Id. at 21.
43. See id. at 24-25.
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gregate forming an overall social utility."'44 Critics offered a
second model: civic republicanism. This model, which rejected
utilitarianism, required participants "to put aside private in-
terests and deliberate upon the greater common good."45 In
both models, community control over end-value decisions was
deemed critical.46
Collectively, these four characteristics, broadly stated, are:
an emphasis on traditional environmental hazards, particu-
larly pollution; a remedial focus on relocation of facilities and
cleaning of polluted ones; an embrace of the norm of equal rep-
resentation in the administration of environmental laws and
policies; and a belief in community activism.
B. Limits
The established framework sometimes furthers, and at
times undermines, environmental justice. It furthers environ-
mental justice when it provides racial and indigenous commu-
nities the concepts and language they need to advocate effec-
tively for the siting and health outcomes they desire.
The framework, however, at times also undercuts envi-
ronmental justice struggles by racial and indigenous communi-
ties because it tends to foster misassumptions about race, cul-
ture, sovereignty, and the importance of distributive justice.
Those misassumptions sometimes lead environmental justice
scholars and activists to miss what is of central importance to
affected communities.
The first misassumption is that for all racialized groups in
all situations, a hazard-free physical environment is their
main, if not only, concern.4 ' Environmental justice advocates
foster this notion by placing emphasis on "high quality envi-
ronments"4' and the adverse health effects caused by exposure
to air pollutants and hazardous waste materials.
44. Id. at 28 n. 102 (citing Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective
on the National Environmental Policy Act's Process for Citizen Participation, 26
ENVTL. L. 53, 57 (1996)).
45. Gauna, supra note 40, at 29.
46. See Bryant, supra note 23, at 598.
47. See Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 1, 23 (1997) (employing environmental justice precepts
beyond health and pollution issues to redefine criminal justice at the turn of the
millennium).
48. Gelobter, supra note 16, at 852.
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Not all facility sitings that pose health risks, however,
warrant full-scale opposition by host communities. Some com-
munities, on balance, are willing to tolerate these facilities for
the economic benefits they confer or in lieu of the cultural or
social disruption that might accompany large-scale remedial
efforts. Other communities, struggling to deal with jobless-
ness, inadequate education, and housing discrimination, indeed
with daily survival, prefer to devote most of their limited time
and political capital to those challenges. In these situations,
racial and indigenous communities may have pressing needs
and long-range goals beyond the re-siting of polluting facili-
ties.49
For example, as Native communities endeavor to amelio-
rate conditions of poverty and social dislocation by encouraging
the economic development of tribal lands, some increasingly
find themselves in conflict with environmentalists, who are
sometimes but not always environmental justice advocates. In
the mining industry, several Native American tribes are at-
tempting to tap mineral resources on their reservations. °
Urged by the increased emphasis on economic self-
determination in federal Native American policy in the 1970s,
the tribes formed the Council of Energy Resource Tribes to deal
49. See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Red, and Poisoned,
in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
53, 69-71 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) (discussing letters by the Southwest Or-
ganizing Project that express exasperation with environmentalists eliminating
environmental hazards at the cost of ignoring survival needs and cultures). The
"Shintech Saga" in Louisiana, in which environmental justice advocates chal-
lenged a $700 million chemical plant planned for a predominantly black commu-
nity (in an area known as "cancer alley"), is an example of how the established
framework does not analytically account for the social, economic, and cultural
complexities of racial communities. While the EPA focused on statistical analy-
ses, the controversy:
resulted in split allegiances within the greater African-American com-
munity, pitting the Reverend Jesse Jackson and Congressional Black
Caucus (urging EPA to stop the plant) against the National Black
Chamber of Commerce and the local chapter of the NAACP (supporting
the jobs and economic growth the plant would provide to the economi-
cally depressed community).
Worsham, supra note 14, at 659.
50. See Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-
Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowl-
edge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 302 (1996); see also Ronald Trosper, Traditional Ameri-
can Indian Economic Policy, 19 AM. INDIAN CULTURE AND RES. J., NO. 1, 1995, at
87-88 (analyzing the situation of overgrazing of cattle and sheep on the Navajo
reservation).
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with both the siting of new mines on Native American lands
and the environmental and the cultural problems that might
result.51 Those efforts met stiff opposition from some environ-
mental groups concerned mainly with land degradation and
pollution. The environmentalists' seeming lack of under-
standing of the economic and cultural complexity of the Native
American groups' decisions have led some Native Americans to
express cynicism about environmentalists who sometimes treat
them as mascots for the environmental cause.52
The established framework also assumes that fair distribu-
tion of physical burdens is the primary, if not sole, means of
achieving environmental justice. Sheila Foster rejects this as-
sumption as "monolithic"53 and "one-dimensional,"54 focusing
"too much on outcomes and not enough on the processes that
produce those outcomes."55 According to Foster, by not ad-
dressing why racial communities are overexposed to pollution,
hazardous waste sites, and poisoned fish stocks, agencies like
the EPA fail to confront: "discriminatory housing and real es-
tate policies and practices, residential segregation and limited
residential choices influenced by such discrimination, discrimi-
natory zoning regulations and ineffective land use policies, ra-
cial disparities in the availability of jobs and municipal serv-
ices, imbalances in political access and power, and 'white
flight."5
6
The established framework's prescription of the public's
role is also limited. Under the pluralist model, since
"[p1references are defined by the relative power of self-
interested subjects[,] they may be distorted by existing ine-
qualities, poorly construed as a result of exclusion and unequal
political clout or prove simply unethical." 7  Since
"[e]nvironmental justice challenges reside in an ethical dimen-
sion beyond"" utilitarian choices, the pluralism model cannot
resolve all problems associated with environmental racism.
51. See Tsosie, supra note 50, at 302.
52. See id. at 324-25.
53. See Foster, supra note 28, at 790.
54. See Foster, supra note 13, at 741.
55. Id. at 748.
56. Id. at 736-37.
57. Gauna, supra note 40, at 36-37.
58. Id. at 46.
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The civic republican model may seem "intuitively better
equipped to respond to the ethical claim of environmental jus-
tice"59 by depending on a discourse of the "common good." But,
critics ask, how realistic is it to believe that self-interested
groups will sacrifice their economic self-interest to an often
vaguely defined "common good"?6" The "common good," fur-
thermore, is an elastic concept, expanding and contracting de-
pending upon historical, social, and cultural context and power
disparities within a community.6'
Finally, the established framework tends to assume that
all racial and indigenous groups, and therefore racial and in-
digenous group needs, are the same.62 In general, it assumes
that in terms of cultural needs and political-legal remedies, one
size fits all. This simplifying assumption is rooted in the long-
standing perception of many disciplines that race is fixed and
biologically determined rather than socially constructed and
that it is, therefore, largely devoid of cultural content. It is also
rooted in the related perception that skin color and hair type
are the reason for ill-treatment by some, but are otherwise ir-
relevant to social interactions-that beyond biological distinc-
tions, all people (and groups) are essentially the same.63 A
number of courts and environmental justice scholars make this
simplifying assumption about race and culture.
1. The Courts
Courts usually forgo meaningful analysis of racial or cul-
tural discrimination in considering environmental justice is-
sues. In particular, when addressing claims of environmental
racism, courts focus their equal protection inquiries on the dis-
parate impact of a governmental decision and a search for ra-
cial animus by individual government actors.64 Under this nar-
59. Id. at 47.
60. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial
Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1610-11 (1988); Gauna, supra note 40, at 48.
61. See Guana, supra note 40, at 50.
62. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
63. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observa-
tions on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(discussing race as socially rather than biologically constructed).
64. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976) (holding that a law is
not unconstitutional solely because of disparate impact unless it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose).
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row approach, affected racial and indigenous communities need
to establish that identified government decisionmakers were
motivated by some form of racial ill-will. This proof is not only
difficult to muster, it focuses attention on government officials
and tends to flatten racial and cultural distinctions into a
monolithic "racial minority" victim. It does not call for partici-
pants to examine closely racial groups' cultural or economic
connections to the environment or the ways in which those
connections have been damaged or possibly enhanced.
This narrow judicial focus is illustrated by two opinions,
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Association v. Macon-Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Commission65 and R.I.S.E. v. Kay.66
In East Bibb Twiggs, African Americans challenged the siting
decision of a landfill in a housing tract populated predomi-
nantly by black residents.67 The court admitted that the land-
fill would impact blacks in the neighborhood to a "somewhat
larger degree,"68 but it held that there was insufficient evidence
to demonstrate any governmental intent to discriminate
against black persons.69 The local planning and zoning com-
mission had earlier decided to place a landfill in a white neigh-
borhood.7° The court thus found, without exploring the institu-
tional and cultural sources of the government's actions, that
there was no "clear pattern" of racial discrimination evidencing
wrongful intent.71
Similarly, in R.I.S.E. v. Kay, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge to the siting of a regional landfill near a his-
torical African American church in an area populated primarily
by African Americans." Three other landfills in the County
were also sited in areas where the racial composition was
ninety-five to one hundred percent African American.73 In ad-
dition to health concerns, R.I.S.E., a predominantly white-led
environmental group, first complained about the decline in
65. 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
66. 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
67. See 706 F. Supp. at 881.
68. See id. at 885.
69. See id. at 886.
70. See id. at 884.
71. See id. at 885.
72. See 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1145 (E.D. Va. 1991).
73. See id. at 1148.
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property values, noise, and increased traffic. Later, the group
raised racially discriminatory siting of the landfill. The court
found that the County's siting of landfills over the past twenty
years did in fact have a disproportionate impact on black resi-
dents.74 It nevertheless held that plaintiffs failed to show that
the siting was racially motivated, without examining what "ra-
cial motivation" might mean in this particular situation to the
affected African American communities. The court, instead,
simply declared that the "Equal Protection Clause does not im-
pose an affirmative duty to equalize the impact of official deci-
sions on different racial groups. Rather, it merely prohibits
government officials from intentionally discriminating on the
basis of race."" Without thoughtfully discussing the African
American community's spiritual and cultural concerns, 6 which
deeply animated its opposition to the siting decision, the court
stated, as a seeming afterthought, that the County had prop-
erly "balanced the economic, environmental, and cultural needs
of the County in a responsible and conscientious manner."77
The courts' narrow application of the discriminatory intent
test in East Bibb and R.I.S.E. reflects an implicit value judg-
ment about racial discrimination that resembles a "strong ver-
sion of color-blind constitutionalism," referred to by Neil Go-
tanda as "formal-race."" When employing formal-race
analysis, courts, denying racial history and existing racial sub-
ordination, treat race as a neutral category.79 Moreover, for-
mal-race analysis overlooks social reality and "fails to recognize
the connections between the race of an individual and the real
social conditions underlying" the current problems.8 "
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Adarand Constructors Inc.
v. Pena is an example of formal-race analysis. In Adarand,
the Supreme Court upheld a constitutional challenge to Con-
74. See id. at 1149.
75. Id. at 1150.
76. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
77. Id.
78. Neil Gotanda, Critique of "Our Constitution in Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 48 (1991).
79. See id. at 47; see also Jen-L A. Wong, Note, Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Pena: A Colorblind Remedy Eliminating Racial Preferences, 18 U. HAW. L. REV.
939, 974-75 (suggesting the United States Supreme Court engaged in formal-race
analysis denying race group history and context).
80. Gotanda, supra note 78, at 7.
81. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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gressionally-authorized affirmative action programs for federal
contractors. Adarand Constructors, a white-owned business,
lost a subcontract bid for guardrail work on a highway con-
struction project. A Hispanic American-owned business pre-
vailed.12  In his concurrence, Justice Scalia called for race-
neutral treatment of all government contracts, declaring that
"[i]n the eyes of the government, we are just one race. It is
American."83 Scalia's vision is an extraordinarily narrow one.
It erases all traces of racial history in the United States and
treats all racial groups the same despite marked differences in
histories, current conditions, and treatment by mainstream
America. Most important, it ignores the contemporary reality
that people of color continue to experience stereotyping and
discrimination.84
Gotanda suggests that the highly formalistic discrimina-
tory intent test also fails to acknowledge a community's "his-
torical-race"85 and "cultural-race." 6 Historical-race means the
historical underpinnings of racial designation or classifica-
tion; 7 cultural-race speaks to the cultural aspects of racial
group identity that gives race social meaning.8 Cultural-race
thus addresses "the customs, beliefs and intellectual and artis-
tic traditions" of a racial group. 9
Palmore v. Sidoti9 ° is illustrative. There, the Supreme
Court devalued cultural-race in its analysis. The Court
unanimously overturned a Florida trial court's decision to
modify a white mother's custody of her child after the mother
married a black man.91 The Court acknowledged that there
was a "risk that a child living with a stepparent of a different
race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not
present if the child were living with parents of the same ethnic
origin." 2 It nevertheless concluded that a court could not con-
82. See id. at 204.
83. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. For further discussion, see Wong, supra note 79, at 971-76.
85. Gotanda, supra note 78, at 39.
86. Id. at 56.
87. See id. at 40.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
91. Gotanda, supra note 78, at 57.
92. Id. at 57-58 (quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433).
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stitutionally consider such private "biases."93 According to Go-
tanda, the Palmore Court "failed to consider.., the possibility
that a Black stepfather might offer a positive value to [a] child
beyond a caring home."94 In a bicultural environment, a child
is exposed to the mother's background, but "also to Black cul-
ture in a way which [a] child could never have experienced in
her biological father's home."95 By failing to recognize this ex-
perience, Gotanda observes that the "Supreme Court simply
lacked the imagination to consider and separate the subordina-
tion dimension of race-the historical-race element which ac-
counted for prejudice outside the home-from the positive con-
cept of culture-race. ' 6
In R.LS.E., discussed earlier, the court disregarded un-
derlying social conditions by neglecting both cultural-race and
historical-race.97 The African American plaintiffs complained
that the landfill would interfere with their community activi-
ties and their worship as African Americans in the Second Mt.
Olive Church; they believed the landfill would desecrate the
special significance of the historic church founded by freed
slaves.9" The court discussed their claims without reference to
history or context and was therefore able to conclude easily
that the African American plaintiffs failed to state a claim of
environmental racism.
For those African Americans, however, the church was his-
torically and socially important to their existence as a racial
community. Indeed the black residents had long been racial-
ized and segregated and had been compelled by Southern ra-
cism to create their own African American institutions. Dese-
cration of the church was, to that community, a racial act with
profound social and cultural consequences.99 By summarily ig-
noring this historical context, the court undermined the black
community's ability to call the local government to account for
93. See id. at 58.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991).
98. See id. at 1147.
99. See infra Part V for a more detailed discussion of the case.
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol.72
the potentially devastating social and cultural impacts of its
decision.10
2. The Commentators
Some commentators on environmental racism treat the
meaning of race with sophistication.1 ' The established frame-
work, however, tends to engender formal-race analysis and
thus to encourage writing about environmental racism without
100. Another example of this narrow judicial focus is illustrated by various
courts and agencies addressing (or not addressing) the issue of environmental ra-
cism through procedural means. For example, forty of the eighty-seven environ-
mental justice Title VI administrative complaints filed with the EPA by Septem-
ber 30, 1999 were "rejected on procedural grounds, such as lack of federal
financial assistance or failure to file within the 180-day statute of limitations."
Luke W. Cole, "Wrong on the Facts, Wrong on the Law": Civil Rights Advocates
Excoriate EPAs Most Recent Title VI Misstep, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10775, 10775
(1999).
Although faced with the opportunity to clarify the area of disparate treatment in
environmental justice Title VI litigation, the United States Supreme Court dis-
missed as moot a recent Title VI environmental justice claim. See Chester Resi-
dents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
granted, 524 U.S. 915, and vacated as moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998). The city of
Chester, located in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, has a population of about
42,000, of which sixty-five percent is African American. See Seif, 132 F.3d at 927
n.1. The remainder of Delaware County, having a population of approximately
502,000, is ninety-one percent white. See id. An organization of Chester resi-
dents alleged that the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
("PADEP") violated their civil rights by issuing a permit to a private corporation
to operate a hazardous waste facility in the city. See id. at 927.
Since 1987, PADEP issued five waste facility permits for sites in the city of Ches-
ter. See id. at 927 n.1. By stark contrast, the entire remainder of Delaware
County only received two such permits during the same time period. See id.
However, instead of reaching the merits, the case was ultimately decided on the
issue of plaintiffs standing to sue. See id. at 937. The district court below held
that there was no private right of action under section 602 of Title VI, and thus
dismissed the case, in part on that ground. See Seif, 944 F.Supp. at 413.
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that a disparate impact pri-
vate right of action did exist under section 602 of Title VI, see Seif, 132 F.3d. at
933-37 (3d Cir. 1997), the Supreme Court subsequently vacated the judgment and
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss in accordance with United States
v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). See Seif, 524 U.S. at 974. See generally
Richard Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 835 (1993) (suggesting potential
utility of Title VI for environmental justice claims); Worsham, supra note 14, at
647-49 (discussing EPA Office of Civil Rights' controversial "Interim Guidance for
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits").
101. See infra notes 135-178.
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explanation of, or sometimes even use of, the term, "race." °2
By not acknowledging race and racial context, these writings
are limited. However otherwise illuminating, they do not ad-
dress: (1) racial groups' (or subgroups') differing understand-
ings of "the environment," and of "race" itself; (2) groups' dif-
fering spiritual, cultural, and economic connections to the
environment; and (3) the importance of the environment to the
groups' identities. By treating all racial groups alike, they fail
to provide analytical and organizational frameworks for under-
standing specific environmental justice problems and for tai-
loring actual remedies to meet the needs and goals of different
racial communities. The writings tend to embody a one-size-
fits-all approach, overlooking distinct historical experiences of
particular communities of color and their current cultural and
economic concerns. °3
In doing so, the writings sometimes ignore the distinct
sovereignty-based claims of Native Americans.104 For example,
102. See, e.g., Kevin, supra note 19 (arguing for limited recognition of envi-
ronmental justice claims without thoughtfully addressing the meanings of race
and culture); Alice Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Grist for the Equal Protection
Mill, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 387 (1999) (surveying thoroughly the various perspec-
tives on environmental justice literature without exploring issues of race and cul-
ture); Maura Lynn Tierney, Environmental Justice and Title VI Challenges to
Permit Decisions: The EPA's Interim Guidance, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1277, 1317
(1999) (focusing on Title VI and arguing for the need to balance the interests of
environmentalists, advocates of urban redevelopment, civil rights groups, and
federal, state, and local governments to protect "a community's economic and so-
cial health," but omitting the interests of racial communities). See generally Ge-
lobter, supra note 16, at 841; Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Ra-
cism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394 (1991); Seth D. Jaffe, The Market's Response to
Environmental Inequity: We Have the Solution; What's the Problem?, 14 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 655 (1995); Francisco Leal, Environmental Injustice, 14 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 37 (1994); A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Poten-
tial Misfit Between Equity and Efficiency, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 871 (1992); Jimmy
White, Environmental Justice: Is Disparate Impact Enough?, 50 MERCER L. REV.
1155 (1999).
103. See, e.g., Amanda C.L. Vig, Using Title VI to Salvage Civil Rights From
Waste: Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Seif, 67 U. CIN. L. REV.
907 (1999) (providing insightful analysis of the Third Circuit's decision in Seif, but
discussing only the impact of Seif on "environmental justice plaintiffs"); Mahoney,
supra note 12, at 365 (identifying racism, economic pressures, and lack of political
power as the "[t]hree fundamental obstacles exacerbat[ing] the problems faced by
the environmental justice movement," but not distinguishing racial groups or
analyzing cultural or historical context).
104. There are, however, some recent scholars who address these issues.
For example, Catherine O'Neill, in critiquing the actions of federal and state
health and environmental agencies in response to the problem of contaminated
fish in the Pacific Northwest, points out that "conventional understanding...
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stories of waste disposal on Native American reservations re-
cently inspired a series of derisively titled news articles,
"Dances with Garbage."' ' The Campo Band in California de-
cided to build a waste landfill on its reservation, sparking ve-
hement protest not from tribal members, but from non-Native
local residents." 6 In New Mexico, the Mescalero Apaches are
negotiating with a private company to locate a monitored, re-
trievable storage nuclear waste facility on their lands, inciting
the wrath of non-Native neighbors.'
These stories turn sideways traditional environmentalist
notions of Native Americans as the primitive foot soldiers in
the war against pollution. The disputes also destabilize the
conventional wisdom of the environmental justice movement
that opposes as discriminatory the siting of the same sort of
waste disposal facilities that some Native tribes are cautiously
inviting onto their lands."0 ' Viewed paternalistically, the ques-
tion might be: Are the tribes acting against their better judg-
ment, imperiling both the environment and themselves?
Viewed critically, the question might be different: Are the
tribes, after calculation, exercising rights of self-determination
fails to appreciate the cultural dimension of the harm and fails to recognize the
integral role of fish, fishing, and fish consumption in the lives of the Pacific
Northwest peoples." O'Neill, supra note 27, at 9.
105. See Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternal-
ism: One Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in
Indian Country, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 933, 933 n.2 (1992).
106. See id.; see also DAN MCGOVERN, THE CAMPO INDIAN LANDFILL WAR:
THE FIGHT FOR GOLD IN CALIFORNIA'S GARBAGE (1995).
107. See Conrad L. Huygen, Mescalero Revisited, ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y J., Dec. 1996, at 52, 53; Louis G. Leonard, III, Sovereignty, Self-
Determination, and Environmental Justice in the Mescalero Apache's Decision to
Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 651 (1997).
108. Other tribes have rejected overtures made by non-Native waste corpo-
rations interested in siting such facilities on their reservations as insulting to
their cultural values and tantamount to genocide. Many Native communities are
looking to traditional cultural values for guidance in environment and economic
developmental decisionmaking. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
Tribes have cited their unique cultural beliefs to support the imposition of strin-
gent tribal environmental regulations on non-Natives. See Peter M. Manus, The
Owl, the Indian, the Feminist, and the Brother: Environmentalism Encounters the
Social Justice Movements, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 249, 269 (1996). Even in
situations like those faced by the Campo Band, Tsosie suggests that tribes may
not be so much "abandoning" their cultural values as "subordinating" certain val-
ues to other less glamorized but equally central norms such as "ensuring the sur-
vival of the people and a decent standard of living." See Tsosie, supra note 50, at
326.
[Vol.72
20011 RACIALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 331
in order to build an economic base to assure cultural and politi-
cal survival?
Context is key here in framing the relevant question. In
the Campo Band's situation, poverty, poor land quality, and lo-
cation played important roles.1" 9 But other factors contributed,
including the tribe's ability to dictate contractual terms, to es-
tablish health and safety standards11 ° and, significantly, to
counter the ongoing assault on tribal economic sovereignty by
non-Natives outside the reservation."' According to their at-
torneys, the major problem facing tribes seeking to build com-
mercial waste disposal projects is not the "environment," but
"power and race." 2 The "clear implication [from outsiders] is
that Indians lack the intelligence to balance and protect ade-
quately their own economic and environmental interests. [But
w]e need the support and understanding of the environmental
community, not its protection. ' 1 3  Contextual analysis, thus,
reveals different questions: How might a tribe's decision to site
such a facility on its lands enhance tribal efforts to improve
education, health, elder care, housing, and care for other tribal
lands? With what social and economic tradeoffs? And who
should make the judgment call?
Much of the environmental justice literature focuses on the
causes, symptoms, and solutions associated with the uneven
distribution of environmental burdens and recognizes race as a
"factor"114 or a "potent variable"1 ' in determining "who gets
what, where, and why."116 A leading scholar in the area, Robert
D. Bullard, did just this in helping to establish the prevailing
environmental justice framework'17 discussed earlier.118 In his
109. See Tsosie, supra note 50, at 306-07.
110. See Gover & Walker, supra note 105, at 936-41.
111. See Tsosie, supra note 50, at 308 (noting that the tribe apparently per-
ceived the risk to its sovereignty as more pressing than the risk of groundwater
contamination).
112. See Gover & Walker, supra note 105, at 942.
113. Id. at 942-43.
114. See Richard J. Lazarus, Distribution in Environmental Justice: Is there
a Middle Ground?, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 481, 488 (1994).
115. See Robert D. Bullard, The Legacy of American Apartheid and Envi-
ronmental Racism, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 445, 450 (1994).
116. Id.
117. Dr. Bullard's critique of mainstream environmentalism suggests that
the environmental protection paradigm does the following:
(1) institutionalizes unequal enforcement; (2) trades human health for
profit; (3) places the burden of proof on the "victims," not on the polluting
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path-breaking 1990 book, Dumping in Dixie, Bullard provided
a detailed account of problems and dispute-handling mecha-
nisms used by residents of five different racial communities.'19
Each case study addressed: issue crystallization, leadership
type, opposition tactics, resolution mechanisms, and out-
come.12 ° Bullard's studies recognized race as a potent variable
in determining a community's needs, resources, and support.
The case studies also characterized environmental issues in
terms of conservation, public health, and economic tradeoffs. 121
Bullard thus wedded community activism theory with en-
vironmental protection and in spectacular fashion opened a
crucial dimension of U.S. racism to scrutiny and remediation.
He did not, however, examine closely how groups are racialized
or how culture influences group perceptions and goals; nor did
he acknowledge that communities of color and their relation-
ship to the environment differ in important ways.
Other scholars recognize that race, along with class, is cru-
cial to understanding the unequal distribution of environ-
industry; (4) legitimates human exposure to harmful chemicals, pesti-
cides, and hazardous substances; (5) promotes "risky" technologies, such
as incinerators; (6) exploits the vulnerability of economically and politi-
cally disenfranchised industry around risk assessment; (7) subsidizes
ecological destruction; (8) creates an industry around risk assessment;
(9) delays cleanup actions; and (10) fails to develop pollution prevention
as the overarching and dominant strategy.
Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR xv, at xvi (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
Dr. Bullard's framework for environmental justice consists of five basic charac-
teristics:
1. Incorporates the principle of the right of all individuals to be pro-
tected from environmental degradation,
2. Adopts a public health model of prevention (elimination of the threat
before harm occurs) as the preferred strategy,
3. Shifts the burden of proof to polluters and dischargers who do harm
or discriminate or who do not give equal protection to racial and ethnic
minorities and other "protected" classes,
4. Allows disparate impact and statistical weight, as opposed to "in-
tent," to infer discrimination,
5. Redresses disproportionate risk burdens through targeted action and
resources.
Id. at 10.
118. See supra notes 11, 19, 32, 34, 49, 117 and accompanying text.
119. See BULLARD, supra note 8.
120. See id. at 46-47.
121. See id. at 48.
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mental burdens. 122 Even these scholars, however, do not ex-
amine the differential racialization of minority and indigenous
groups, oftentimes lumping all "racial" groups into one. For in-
stance, many writings use, without explanation, the terms "ra-
cial minority communities," "communities of color," or "people
of color."123 These categories are cited without discussion of the
cultural, social, and political differences among racial groups
and without an analysis of how these categories are socially
and politically constructed.'24
One example is the insightful writing of environmental
justice advocate Charles Lee. Lee acknowledges that "some
communities are more equal than others."2 He also acknowl-
edges that "communities that suffer from environmental ineq-
uities also suffer from social inequities,"'26 including housing
discrimination and residential segregation, inadequate health
care, and lack of fair opportunity in education and employ-
ment. "'27 Lee, though, tends to overlook the racial and social
differences among these communities. For example, he lists
the environmental inequities from which "[t]hese so called
'other side of the track' communities suffer."12  By character-
izing racial minority groups as "other side of the track commu-
nities" and broadly listing "their problems," Lee flattens impor-
tant cultural, social, and locale distinctions.
3. Critical Re-examination of Race, Culture and
Sovereignty
Richard Lazarus, on the other hand, identifies the concep-
tual flaw in treating all racial groups in the same way by ac-
knowledging that policymakers often ignore "cultural assump-
tions [that] affect environmental protection standards."29 He
recalls an EPA report dismissing the claims of environmental
inequity. The report attributed disparity in exposure to con-
122. See supra notes 117, 120-124 and accompanying text.
123. See Lee, supra note 14, at 573; see also YOUNG, supra note 27 (discuss-
ing the concept and meaning of equity and society's distributive problems); Fisher,
supra note 22, at 461.
124. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
125. Lee, supra note 14, at 571.
126. Id. at 573.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Lazarus, supra note 114, at 485.
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taminated fish consumption to the fact that "[s]ome popula-
tions ... and some cultural groups, consume more fish than the
average population.""13 The report implied that those groups
who choose to eat more fish must suffer the risk of increased
contamination since they can reduce the risk simply by eating
less fish. Lazarus observes that in making these assumptions,
the EPA disregarded those distinct communities that catch and
consume more fish on a daily basis as a matter of historical and
cultural practice.131
Lazarus thus aptly identifies the cultural flattening re-
flected in this kind of environmental justice policymaking,
though he also tends to simplify the notion of culture. He
frames the issue of differing group behavior and needs in terms
of the quantity of fish consumption; he does not develop how
fishing itself might be the central facet of communal and eco-
nomic life of the group or how contamination of fish may do
more than pose health risks-it may destroy the cultural and
economic fabric of the community.
By contrast, Catherine O'Neill directly addresses the issue
of cultural harm to Native Americans due to contaminated fish
in the Puget Sound and Columbia River Basin.'32 O'Neill
points out that because agencies frame the problem as "harm to
individual humans' physical health,"'33 this merely "separates
out and recognizes but a single strand-individual humans'
physical health-from an integrated set of harms wrought by
chemical contamination."134 O'Neill recognizes that "the con-
tours of environmental injustice are different for Native Ameri-
cans than for other affected groups, and so remedying the in-
justice will require consideration of a different constellation of
issues-among other things, recognition of the unique histori-
cal and legal aspects of Native Americans' claims."13 In addi-
tion, O'Neill recognizes that certain environmental risks are
"disproportionately imposed on some identifiable Native
130. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 230-R-92-008A, 2
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, at 12 (1992).
131. See id. Professor Lazarus made these and the other comments recited
about the EPA report at a panel presentation, and therefore, did not have the op-
portunity to develop them in depth.
132. See O'Neill, supra note 27, at 9.
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id. at 9.
135. Id.
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American subpopulations," distinct from other subpopulations
and the general population as a whole.136 O'Neill predicts that
"an understanding of discrimination as cultural suppression
may undergird recent governmental cognizance of environ-
mental injustice.""7
What O'Neill identifies and what is missing from many
other commentators' accounts is an express understanding of
how race and culture operate in contemporary U.S. communi-
ties. Racial categories are not biological realities. Rather, they
are socially constructed by culture, politics, history, and human
interaction. 138  By perceiving race as fixed and objective-in-
stead of socially constructed-the established environmental
justice framework tends to treat "race [as] a neutral, apolitical
term, divorced from social content"1 39 and devoid of cultural
meaning. This further reflects the inclination of many courts
and commentators to avoid facing race through the "painful
revelations that may be lurking in an examination of either ra-
cial history or the current racial disparities of society." 4 '
II. AN EMERGING NATIVE AMERICAN FRAMEWORK
As part of a critical re-examination, Native American legal
scholars are attempting to develop an integrated environ-
mental, race, and sovereignty framework by approaching envi-
ronmental justice with greater cultural and historical depth.
For example, Williamson B. C. Chang"' "contends that Euro-
centric conceptualizations of nature have dominated the dis-
course on environment and race to the exclusion of other cul-
tural perspectives. '  In particular, for Chang, the term
136. Id. at 18.
137. Id. at 90-91.
138. See Lopez, supra note 63, at 8-9 (discussing race as socially rather than
biologically constructed).
139. Susan Serrano, Comment, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Pur-
poses: Yniguez and the Racialization of English Only, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 238
(1997). See also Gotanda, supra note 78, at 32.
140. John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analy-
sis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REV. 313, 324 (1993-94).
141. Williamson B.C. Chang, The "Wasteland" in the Western Exploitation of
"Race" and the Environment, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (1992).
142. Robert W. Collin, Review of the Legal Literature on Environmental Ra-
cism, Environmental Equity, and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG.
121, 162 (1994) (reviewing Williamson Chang's article); see also Chang, supra
note 141, at 849-52.
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"environmental racism" reaffirms a framework in which politi-
cal and civil rights are confused with indigenous peoples'
claims.'43 Among groups with racial identities (whether im-
posed or chosen), Chang differentiates "Americans by consent"
(mainly racial immigrants) from "Americans by conquest" (in-
digenous groups).' More generally, Chang maintains that
problems of race and environment will not be solved until
greater attention is paid to indigenous people "who hold com-
pletely different attitudes towards scarcity and human influ-
ence on nature."
1 45
Like Chang, Robert A. Williams, Jr. offers a view of envi-
ronmental justice that departs from the established framework.
Williams suggests that society "decolonize" environmental law
to account for "Indian visions of environmental justice."46 Ac-
cording to Williams, in many American Indian belief systems,
there is "an intimate relation between the spiritual world, the
physical world, and the social world."47 In contrast, the
American system of environmental values has "lost its sense of
reliance on nature for survival,... lost [its] sense of respect for
the world,"' 14 and failed to recognize that human values and
environmental values are "intimately connected with who we
are as human beings."1 49 Therefore, for Williams, society can-
not change environmental racism without grasping what it
means to be spiritually, physically, and socially connected to
the environment.
William A. Shutkin also offers an indigenous perspective to
environmental justice that "embodies the distinctively Native
American conception of the environment as a key to a healthy
community." 5 ° According to Shutkin, "the political, social, and
cultural [lives] of Native American communities are inextrica-
bly linked to environmental health because the 'environment is
not something "out there," but something deep within each of
143. See Chang, supra note 141, at 867.
144. See id. at 860.
145. Id. at 852.
146. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Pina-
tas, and Apache Sacred Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multi-
cultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133, 1164 (1994).
147. Id. at 1153.
148. Id. at 1164.
149. Id. at 1134-35.
150. William A. Shutkin, The Concept of Environmental Justice and a Re-
conception of Democracy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 579, 586 (1994-95).
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us, a part of each of us."'15 1 Undertaking this indigenous per-
spective, the environment infuses and affects all forms of social
life. 152
In a comprehensive treatment of land ethics and environ-
mental law, Rebecca Tsosie finds a strong link between tradi-
tional Anglo-American philosophy and American environ-
mental law and policy. 153 Tsosie finds contemporary American
environmentalism rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition's
emphasis on individual endeavor and focus on man as master
of all creation, as well as in secular economic norms of "order,"
"reform," and "opportunity."154 These principles connect to an
overarching value system "that places humans at the center of
thought and land as an accessory to human use." 55 This an-
thropocentric value system forms the foundation of the envi-
ronmental movement and, for Tsosie, clashes with traditional
Native views of the universe and the place of humans within
it.156
Native communities in the United States tend to share
general cultural value and belief systems that are distinguish-
able from those of the Western world. 57 As many commenta-
tors have observed, traditional Native worldviews tend to be
"holistic" or "ecocentric" in orientation.1 58 Instead of drawing a
line between subject and object, self and the environment, or
spirit and matter, traditional Native worldviews tend to see the
151. Id. at 586 (quoting the Pre-filed Testimony of Tribal Judge Michael
Delaney, The Abenaki Nation, In re Champlain Oil Company, (No. CUD-94-11)
(Mar. 9, 1995)).
152. See id.
153. Tsosie, supra note 50, at 259-66; see also CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds., 2d ed. 2000). Professor
Tsotsie links philosophy to American environmental law and policy. To what ex-
tent does that linkage extend to environmental justice scholarship and practice?
Professor Chang and others argue that there is a direct connection. See Chang,
supra note 141, at 849-52.
154. See Tsosie, supra note 50, at 248-59.
155. Id. at 259.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 268-72 (noting the difficulties of finding a distinct "Native
voice" in environmental protection).
158. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., RED EARTH, WHITE LIES: NATIvE
AMERICANS AND THE MYTH OF SCIENTIFIC FACT (1995); Ronald Trosper, Tradi-
tional American Indian Economic Policy, 19 AM. INDIAN CULTURE AND RES. J. 65
(1995).
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creation as an integrated whole.'59 This understanding of hu-
mans as merely one element of a greater "oneness" is both re-
lated to and different from a revitalized aspect of environ-
mental law: the public trust doctrine and its premise that
people ("the public") should be stewards of the physical envi-
ronment.,60
From this perspective, modern environmentalism thus im-
plicitly promotes an anthropocentric ethic of nature as prop-
erty, dismissing the physical, cultural, and spiritual relation-
ship between Native communities and the land. For this
reason, Robert A. Williams criticizes American environmental
law as "colonized by a perverse system of values which is anti-
thetical to achieving environmental justice for American Indian
peoples." 6' The Anglo-American value system, he asserts,
"privileges what it labels as 'human values' over 'environ-
mental values,"' ignoring how "both sets of values are inti-
mately connected to ... the complete set of forces which give
meaning and life to our world."'62 For Native peoples, nature is
not property. Nature is culture, religion, even family.'63 Na-
ture is home. For these scholars, prevailing environmentalism,
with its anthropocentric premises, thus undermines the very
thing it seeks to promote: genuine environmental justice.
James Huffman also criticizes the traditional environ-
mental justice framework, but from the perspective of Native
American economic development. He identifies three assump-
tions of modern environmental thought that work against Na-
159. See Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Under-
standing, Preserving, and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native
Hawaiians: Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 175, 181-85 (1992) (describing the "holistic" view of Native cultures).
160. Integrating a wealth of prior scholarship on indigenous cultures, Tsosie
thus identifies four central features of native environmental belief systems. First,
Native cultures perceive the natural world as an animate being deserving care
and respect. See Tsosie, supra note 50, at 276-79. Second, the relationship be-
tween humans and nature is one of "kinship" rather than "ownership." See id. at
279-82. Third, land and place hold special significance for Native community
identity. See id. at 282-85. Finally, "reciprocity" and "balance" serve as the
guiding principles of native culture. See id. at 285-87.
161. Williams, supra note 146, at 1134.
162. Id. at 1134-35.
163. See Chang, supra note 141, at 857 ("In the Hawaiian world, if one un-
derstands natural resources to be an extension of one's family, accumulating more
cousins really does not make much sense. One is born into a family and cannot do
much to change it."). Id.
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tive interests.' First, orthodox environmentalism assumes
the existence of a scientifically "correct" natural condition and
thus tends toward oppressive command and control methods.'65
The second assumption is that regulations must limit develop-
ment and growth.166 Finally, in marked contrast to arguments
that anthropocentrism in American environmentalism clashes
with Native cultural beliefs, Huffman asserts that American
environmentalism assumes a "biocentric" approach fundamen-
tally opposed to economic development, even when necessary
for Native survival.16 7 He criticizes environmental protection
as a "luxury good" enjoyed by wealthier societies1 68 that pro-
motes the idea that "the poverty and economic depression of
the reservations [is] not only inevitable but desired." 69
Huffman's critique is harsh: "Native Americans, more than
any other segment of American society, will suffer at the altar
of environmentalism worshipped in their name."'7 ° Commenta-
tor Conrad Huygen arrives at a similar conclusion: "We have
romanticized indigenous cultures in a manner that threatens to
stifle development on reservations and perpetuate the poverty
that permeates them."'7' In more measured terms, Tsosie
agrees with Huffman's view that "national implementation of
centralized policies (whatever their origin and content) often
disregards tribal sovereignty and the special interests of in-
digenous peoples."'72
From these varied visions of Native American scholars
emerges a point of commonality: traditional environmentalism
and, by extension, the established environmental justice
framework, do not necessarily work well for Native Americans
or for other racial and indigenous groups.'73 In light of the
164. See James L. Huffman, An Exploratory Essay on Native Americans and
Environmentalism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 909-19 (1992).
165. See id. at 911-14.
166. See id. at 914-16.
167. See id. at 916-19.
168. See id.
169. Id. at 919.
170. Id. at 902.
171. Huygen, supra note 107, at 57.
172. Tsosie, supra note 50, at 325.
173. The dysfunction includes the conflicts between well-intentioned conser-
vationism and native knowledge-for instance, displacement of tribes to accom-
modate national parks and the simmering dispute between native gatherers and
proponents of endangered species protection and animal rights. See, e.g., Tsosie,
supra note 50, at 239-41 (relating how protection of the Mexican Spotted Owl
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philosophical and practical limitations of the established envi-
ronmental justice framework, the writings of Professors Chang,
Williams, Shutkin, Tsosie, and Huffman illuminate an indige-
nous American cultural perspective on the environment, race,
and sovereignty. They demonstrate how the dominant envi-
ronmental justice narrative tends to ignore or even undermine
that perspective.
Although illuminating in important respects, the emerging
Native American framework itself is limited. It reconstructs
environmental justice in terms of a more or less singular in-
digenous perspective of the environment. This perspective is
important for indigenous groups facing environmental injus-
tice-or seeking to define for themselves how "the environ-
ment" and "justice" connect. But to a large extent, the writings
overlook salient differences among Native American groups
and subgroups and wide differences among traditionally classi-
fied "racial minorities" in terms of understandings of environ-
mental injustice and how to deal with it.
So how can environmental justice scholars, commentators,
activists, and decision makers grapple with important differ-
ences among groups while advancing concepts, language, and
methods for addressing concrete problems? Shutkin and Lord
suggest that "the legal system has perpetuated environmental
injustice by misreading or disregarding [a] community's his-
tory."174 These scholars urge "a more complete history that in-
corporates not only a view of the past, present, and future, but
also the question of justice."'75
shut down the Navajo Nation's timber enterprise); Manus, supra note 108, at
266-67 (discussing the United States Department of the Interior opinion that the
Endangered Species Act overrides Indian rights); Michael L. Chiropolos, Com-
ment, Inupiat Subsistence and the Bowhead Whale: Can Indigenous Hunting Cul-
tures Coexist with Endangered Animal Species?, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L &
POLY 213 (1994) (exploring tension between honoring indigenous subsistence
practices and preserving endangered species). The Mount Rushmore National
Monument, for example, defaced part of the Black Hills considered sacred by the
Lakota tribe and reserved for them by treaty. See United States v. Sioux Nation
of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980).
Environmentalists also opposed the repatriation of Native sacred objects and cul-
tural patrimony on grounds that they are part of a "public trust:" the "common
heritage of all mankind." See John Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural
Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339 (1989); Richard A Guest, Intellectual Property
Rights and Native American Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111 (1995-96).
174. Charles P. Lord and William A. Shutkin, Environmental Justice and
the Use of History, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1994).
175. Id. at 4.
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Michael Gelobter also suggests that the "history and con-
text of racial struggle ... must be understood" along with envi-
ronmental issues.176 Similarly, Sheila Foster critiques current
environmental justice scholarship as "fail[ing] to articulate co-
herently what exactly [is] at work when we refer to environ-
mental racism."177 For Foster, "contemporary [environmental]
racism cannot be understood apart from the historical and so-
cial contexts that influence discriminatory outcomes and create
structures and institutions that continually reinforce those
outcomes."7 '
This suggested contextual approach moves closer to treat-
ing racial and indigenous groups and their relationships to the
environment in light of cultural and social differences. The ap-
proach, however, needs both expansion and refinement in order
to: (1) address explicitly how racial categories are constructed,
racial identities forged, and racial meanings developed; (2) ac-
count for significant differences between groups traditionally
described as racial minorities (African Americans, Asian
Americans, Latinas/os, and indigenous peoples (including
American Indians, Aleuts, Eskimos, Native Hawaiians)); and
(3) recognize and deal more directly with the influences of
whiteness in the formation and implementation of environ-
mental law and policy. What is needed, then, is a framework
that more subtly interrogates social, political, historical, cul-
tural, and power interactions among whites and racial and in-
digenous groups.
III. RACIALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Critical race theory 79 offers communities and environ-
mental justice proponents important critical tools for evaluat-
ing past experiences and present conditions.' ° Beginning with
a skepticism of legal impartiality common to all legal realists,
critical race theory pays particular attention to the roles that
176. Gelobter, supra note 16, at 848.
177. Foster, supra note 13, at 734.
178. Id. at 733-34.
179. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 153.
180. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils
and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 103
(1987) (asserting that although critical legal theories have not fully incorporated
the viewpoints of native peoples, they provide important tools of inquiry).
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race, racism, and nativism play in the formation of legal norms
and the administration of justice. Recognizing the law as a
"text" written by society, critical race theory looks beyond the
law's main story to those "outsider" accounts that the legal sys-
tem suppresses or ignores. Critical race theory thus examines
power in social relationships and seeks to reframe legal con-
cepts of justice by challenging and reworking their implicit bi-
ases. 1 ' It offers an approach for integrating key aspects of the
established environmental justice framework and the emerging
Native peoples' framework with new insights into racial differ-
entiation and empowerment, the influences of whiteness, and
the importance of praxis. That approach is what we call "ra-
cializing environmental justice."
A. Racialization and Differentiation
"Racializing environmental justice," in part, is a method of
inquiry and analysis that builds on critical race theory concepts
of "differential racialization"1 2  and "differential
empowerment."8 3 It recognizes that for traditional "racial mi-
norities" and for America's indigenous peoples, "group and sub-
group identities, political and socioeconomic goals, and 'avail-
able responses' may sometimes coincide and oftentimes
differ."1 84 To better enable scholars, lawyers, and activists to
grapple concretely with the "racism" and "justice" components
of environmental justice, the racializing environmental justice
method inquires into the ways racial (and Native) communities
acquire differing identities, status, and power, and how those
differences affect their respective connections to "the environ-
ment." By acknowledging communities' important racial and
cultural distinctions, the method also frees those communities
and their advocates to identify, and coalesce around, the simi-
larities of treatment by public and private entities with politi-
cal and economic power.
181. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 153.
182. Michael Omi, Out of the Melting Pot and Into the Fire: Race Relations
Policy, in THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: POLICY ISSUES TO THE YEAR
2020, at 199, 207 (1993).
183. Jeff Chang, On Ice Cube's "Black Korea" 19 AMERASIA J. 87, 103
(1993).
184. Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, Responsibility and
Interracial Justice, 3 U.C.L.A. ASIAN PAC. AMER. L.J. 33, 62 (1995).
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Critical race theory challenges the very concept of "race" as
"immutable" or biological, as something objective and largely
devoid of social content or historical context."' 5 It moves ana-
lytical understandings of "race" beyond its conception as "an
independent variable requiring little or no elaboration."8 6 For
Michael Omi and Howard Winant, race is understood "as an
unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meanings con-
stantly being transformed by political struggle."8 7 Race, and,
more particularly, racial categories and identities, are continu-
ally formed and reformed through social and political struggle.
This process of racialization"'8 extends "racial meaning to a
previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or
group."18 9 Racializing environmental justice thus entails inter-
rogation into the ways evolving public perceptions and the par-
ticular struggles of a community have generated racial or cul-
tural meanings for that community.
For example, for Asian Americans, different social forces
lead to differential racialization of Asian American groups.
Omi sees class cleavages, which create different levels of racial
status and power for subgroups, as a primary factor. 9 ' "The
problems encountered by a rich entrepreneur from Hong Kong
and a recently arrived Hmong refugee are obviously distinct.
The sites and types of discriminatory acts each is likely to en-
counter, and the range of available responses to them, differ by
class location."'1  Differential racialization may exist even
within subgroups, such as between a first generation Vietnam-
ese American immigrant and a second generation Vietnamese
American,'92 or as between black descendants of Jamaica and
Senegal. Pat Chew thus "adds country of origin, length of
185. See generally Serrano, supra note 139, at 238; CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
supra note 153; MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994).
186. Omi, supra note 182, at 203.
187. OMI & WINANT, supra note 185, at 55.
188. For further discussion of the differential racialization process in the
context of English only rules, see generally Serrano, supra note 139, at 221.
189. Omi, supra note 182, at 203.
190. See Yamamoto, supra note 184, at 61.
191. Omi, supra note 182, at 207.
192. See Yamamoto, supra note 184, at 61 (citing Omi, supra note 182, at
207).
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United States residence [as well as] gender to the differential
racialization calculus."193
The racialization process, furthermore, "fixes status and
allocates power differentially among and within racial
groups."'94 So, for instance, more 'established' immigrant
groups, with greater resources and access to political power
may organize around mobility issues ('glass ceiling), while re-
cent immigrant groups may focus on 'survival issues' (funding
for language classes and job-training programs)."'95 As a re-
sult, differential racialization primarily pursues a framing of
race that acknowledges that historical and contemporary social
and cultural influences have important consequences for "indi-
vidual identity and collective consciousness, and political or-
ganization."'96
For Native peoples, differential racialization fosters an-
other kind of inquiry, one that addresses often substantial dif-
ferences among immigrant racial populations in America, im-
ported slaves, and conquered indigenous peoples. The inquiry
focuses on the effects of land dispossession, culture destruction,
loss of sovereignty, and, in turn, on claims to self-
determination and nationhood (rather than to equality and in-
tegration).
To further refine the differential racialization analysis,
"Jeff Chang suggests a notion of 'differential forms of disem-
powerment among communities of color.""97  Differential dis-
empowerment focuses on recognition of power differences
among racial or Native groups and sees power in terms of
status, locale, time, and economics. 9 ' Disempowerment is used
"to emphasize that [racial] group power in most settings must
be assessed in the context of dominant political and economic
powers in the area."'99 It is "[o]nly when groups acknowledge
193. Id. (citing Pat Chew, Asian Americans: The "Reticent" Minority and
Their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 26 (1994)).
194. Id. at 62. White Americans, too, are not a monolithic group. Values,
interests, practices, and environmental concerns are diverse. Racialization analy-
sis accounts for and reveals this internal group diversity while concomitantly
identifying certain general commonalities. See infra Section B, "Unpacking
Whiteness" for a further discussion.
195. Id. at 61.
196. Omi, supra note 182, at 207.
197. Yamamoto, supra note 184, at 62.
198. See id. at 59-60 n.166.
199. Id.
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how and why they are differentially empowered or disempow-
ered that they can begin to work in coalition and advance their
interests."2 °°
For example, before Hawai'i became a state, "white oligar-
chical control, Asian immigration and Native Hawaiian separa-
tion from land and traditional cultural roots constructed dif-
fering racial group identities."20 ' Native Hawaiians, as the
subjects of a conquered sovereign, and Asians, as first or sec-
ond generation immigrants, were differentially racialized. The
two groups were differently situated although they had experi-
enced similar hardships. Unlike Asian Americans, Native Ha-
waiians underwent land dispossession resulting in large-scale
cultural destruction, along with "death and dying and spiritual
suffering. "202 Moreover, "the rhetoric describing group charac-
teristics, the market distribution of labor, the opportunities for
education, housing and economic advancement towards the
middle of the century lifted Asian Americans above Native
Hawaiians in terms of socio-economic status."2 3
Thus, although mainstream America sometimes treats
"Native Hawaiian" as a race-for example, the U.S. census
classifies Native Hawaiians as a racial group 2° 4 -many Native
Hawaiians view themselves and their social-political situation
in terms of nationhood. 205 Their claims are not to racial equal-
ity but to sovereignty:
It is thus in light of, and not despite, complex historical
group and subgroup interactions, and the power relations
underlying them, that we begin to understand deeply felt
beliefs about group oppression and complex claims for group
justice, that we begin to understand the conflicts, claims,
reparatory efforts and resistance characterizing contempo-
rary Asian American and Native Hawaiian relations. With-
out historicizing contemporary inter-group power relations
and grounding them in concrete particulars, racial groups
facing real life inter-group conflicts and claims of injustice
200. Id.
201. Id. at 62.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 63 (citing LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, HAWAII PONO: A SOCIAL
HISTORY (1961) (describing socio-economic changes in Hawai'i from 1900-1959)).
204. See Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
205. See Eric K. Yamamoto & Chris Iijima, The Colonizer's Story: The Su-
preme Court Violates Native Hawaiian Sovereignty-Again, COLORLINES, May
2000, at 6.
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are likely to assume understandings of "others.". . . Without
attention to differential racialization in the context of both
national and localized "struggles for identity and power,"
racial groups cannot begin to address meaningfully issues of
"mutual misunderstanding and mistrust."20 6
Differential racialization and disempowerment concepts
reveal how history has "present effects on group identity and
group claims 2 °7 and thus provide a preliminary framework for
inquiry into particulars of environmental racism in a given set-
ting. That framework enables us to ask meaningful questions
about the interplay between race and the environment because
it focuses on ways in which history and culture are linked to
what we call "the environment." Specifically, what emerges
from this framework is this: environmental justice must recog-
nize that each racial or Native group is differently situated and
that differing contexts contribute to differing group goals, iden-
tities, and differential group power.208 This idea is important
because it enables scholars, activists, and others to analyze
particular kinds of harms to specific racial or Native communi-
ties and to fashion appropriately tailored remedies for those
harms. When applied, this framework illuminates the under-
lying racialized character of environmental justice claims and
treats each racial or Native community separately according to
its specific socio-economic needs, cultural values, and group
goals.
For example, environmental racism may be different for
Latina/o or African Americans residing in a low-income area
with a toxic waste dump than it is for Native Hawaiians or Na-
tive Americans faced with problems of cultural destruction and
loss of spiritual connection to the land. Their goals, needs, and
racial identities differ. Latinas/os and African Americans may
be mainly concerned about health risks associated with expo-
sure to toxic pollutants, °9 while Native Hawaiians and Native
Americans may be primarily concerned about cultural survival,
economic self-sufficiency, political self-governance, and the
206. Yamamoto, supra note 184, at 64.
207. Id. at 63.
208. See id. at 64.
209. See BULLARD, supra note 8, at 45-78 (describing five case studies
where citizens rallied against governmental decisions to place hazardous waste
dumps in their neighborhoods).
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maintenance of a spiritual connection to the environment. Or
the particular groups may have entirely different concerns and
interests. Racializing environmental justice provides concepts
and language to help scholars, activists, lawyers, and commu-
nity leaders assess how each group is differently situated and
why cultural and socio-economic needs cannot be met by a "one
size fits all" environmental justice remedy.
B. Unpacking Whiteness
Critical race theory also facilitates interrogation of the of-
ten unexamined influences of whiteness on environmental law,
policy, and practice. According to Peter Manus, the environ-
mental movement, from which environmental justice springs in
part, "is determined by the norms or perceptions of white
mainstream America."210 Manus thus attributes the tension
between environmentalism and other social justice movements
to environmentalism's "elitist roots, conceived of and imple-
mented primarily from a white, male, and mainstream perspec-
tive" and to its resulting "proclivity to immerse itself in pure
science, as opposed to human science, and to express itself in
command-and-control regulation, as opposed to consensus."211
To what extent, if at all, is this true?
Critical race theory helps us grapple with this question by
unpacking whiteness. In law, whiteness is the racial refer-
ent--"inequality" means "not equal to white." Whiteness is the
norm.212 Yet whiteness itself, until recently, has been largely
unexplored. Critical race theorists and historians are now un-
raveling the often hidden strands of white influence and privi-
lege and the ways in which whiteness (as a norm and as a ra-
cial identity) dramatically, yet quietly, shapes all racial
relationships. 3 Joe Feagin observes the following about the
influence of Anglo law, religion, and language:
210. Yamamoto, supra note 184, at 45.
211. Manus, supra note 108, at 297-98.
212. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE (1996) (describing how whiteness is the norm for citizenship).
213. See generally CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds., 1997); George A. Martinez, The Legal
Construction of Race: Mexican Americans and Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV.
321 (1997); DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING
OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1999).
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From the 1700s to the present, .. . [ilmmigrant assimila-
tion has been seen as one-way, as conformity to the Anglo-
Protestant culture: "If there is anything in American life
which can be described as an overall American culture ... it
can best be described.. . as the middle-class cultural pat-
terns of largely white Protestant, Anglo-Saxon origins."214
White influence is so pervasive that it often goes unno-
ticed. It is, according to Barbara Flagg, "transparent":
In this society, the white person has an everyday option not
to think of herself in racial terms at all. In fact, whites ap-
pear to pursue that option so habitually that it may be a de-
fining characteristic of whiteness .... I label the tendency
for whiteness to vanish from whites' self-perception the
transparency phenomenon.
215
Integral to this transparency is "the very vocabulary we
use to talk about discrimination."216 "Evil racist individuals"
discriminate; by implication, all others do not. This vocabulary
hides "power systems and the privilege that is their natural
companion.
211
Critical race theory thus pushes environmental justice
proponents to examine the white racism (and sometimes the
racism by other groups) that undergirds the environmental
problems affecting Native communities and communities of
color. It also challenges proponents to closely interrogate the
influence of whiteness in environmental law, policy, and prac-
tice, and its effect, in turn, on established approaches to envi-
ronmental justice controversies.
The need to unpack whiteness in the environmental
movement is revealed by the recent leadership struggles of the
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now Earth Justice Legal De-
214. Joe Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles: The Deep Roots of Nativism, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT 18 (Juan F. Perea ed. 1997) (quoting MILTON M. GORDON,
ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE 72-73 (1964)); see also Derrick Bell, White Supe-
riority in America: Its Legacy, Its Economic Costs, 33 VILL. L. REV. 767 (1988).
215. Barbara Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969 (1993);
see also ROEDIGER, supra note 213.
216. Stephanie Wildman & Adrienne Davis, Making Systems of Privilege
Visible, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED 11, 12 (1996); see also DAVID ROEDIGER,
TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS (1994).
217. Wildman and Davis, supra note 216, at 12.
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fense Fund). While the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund
("LDF") is only part of the environmental movement, its long
history and prominent profile lend significance to its conflicts
over race. Recently, Judge LaDoris Hazzard Cordell served as
the first African American head of the Sierra Club LDF. After
eight months, she resigned as chair of the board. An African
American staff attorney, Veronica Eady, also departed. Both
charged the organization with "not putting enough emphasis
on the environmental problems of minority communities."218
Judge Cordell expressed sadness at Eady's resignation and
identified the source of the Sierra Club LDF's difficulties as the
reluctance of many of its supporters to acknowledge the racial-
ized nature of important environmental problems. "[M]any
people in the minority community 'who do not support the tra-
ditional environmental organizations would do so if these
groups would begin working sincerely and earnestly in the area
of environmental justice."'219
The Sierra Club LDF has faced considerable difficulty in
moving its supporters "from the traditional 'turf and critters'
agenda to issues affecting minority communities.""22 Letters by
Williams L. Rutherford, a retired board member, reflect a
genuine problem. Criticizing a proposed alliance on environ-
mental issues with the NAACP, his letter to the Sierra Club
LDF president described the NAACP as "'one of the most dia-
bolical organizations in this nation,' and a 'black man's Ku
Klux Klan.""'22 Rutherford asserted that he did not want the
Sierra Club LDF to get into "'those areas"' because "'we [have]
enough baggage."'222 Another letter to Judge Cordell deemed
"her board role 'interesting' because 'in the [forty] years I have
worked intensely in environmental matters, I have found total
disinterest among children or adults of your race in environ-
mental matters.' 223
The Sierra Club (an organization separate from the LDF)
recently voted on a proposal to reduce U.S. immigration from
900,000 a year to around 200,000, because "population growth
218. Victoria Slind-Flor, Amid Board Rancor, Sierra Club LDF Loses 2d
Black, NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 30, 1995, at A-6.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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is the source of environmental problems in America."224  The
simple environmental solution: "[ciut off the immigrants,"225
who are mainly Asian and Latina/o. Though the Club leader-
ship predicted a "landslide" vote against the proposal, forty
percent voted to support it.
Journalist Emil Guillermo dubbed the forty percent of the
Sierra Club that voted in favor of the proposal the "Mean
Green."226 Anti-immigration nativism, he said, "adopted the
green shield of environmentalism to mask its racism."227 Con-
servative groups paid nearly $1 million to support the pro-
posal's campaign. Some of the "most virulent anti-immigration
groups have accepted money from the Pioneer Fund, which has
long supported white supremacist views."228
According to Guillermo, these anti-immigrant groups, em-
boldened by the Sierra Club proposal, have "turned immigrants
from society's toxin to toxic waste itself."229 Instead of "mere
polluters," immigrants are defined as the "pollutants them-
selves." "From the nativist view, the United States is pristine
water. Immigrants muck it up. It's the subtext of the whole
proposal."23" Alan Kuper, the Sierra Club member responsible
for sponsoring the ballot measure, promised to return with an-
other one, this time creating a newly-formed group, the Sier-
rans for U.S. Population Stabilization.
Certainly, it is unfair to tar all environmentalists with the
political initiatives of the Sierra Club-especially when the
immigration initiative ultimately failed. Many operate from a
place of racial goodwill and have contributed significantly not
only to the traditional environmental justice movement, but
also to the broader justice efforts of racial communities. 2 1 At
the same time it is unfair to racial communities struggling with
224. Emil Guillermo, Sierra Club Settles Immigration-for Now, ASIANWEEK,
Apr. 30, 1998, at 7.
225. See id.
226. See id. (as opposed to the "Just Green").
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Interview with Denise Antolini, former litigation director of Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund Hawai'i, in Honolulu, Hawai'i (March 20, 2001) (de-
scribing successful LDF cases integrating environmental law and indigenous
communities' concerns regarding water and native gathering rights, including the
Waiahole Ditch case, infra Part IV) (notes on file with authors).
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environmental injustice to ignore, or at least discount, the in-
fluences of whiteness in the forging of environmental law
norms and the shaping of strategic environmental practices.
In sum, racializing environmental justice is a method of
inquiry leading to action in environmental justice controver-
sies-a type of praxis.232 It does not displace the established,
and often useful, environmental justice framework. Nor does it
replace the emerging Native American framework-which of-
fers an insightful alternative to Native peoples' conception of
"the environment" and "justice." Rather, in the ways just de-
scribed, racializing environmental justice expands and deepens
the prevailing analysis and strategic calculations of scholars,
lawyers, and activists. Its aim is to theoretically and practi-
cally reframe our understanding of environmental justice to
better account for the experiences, needs, and goals of racial
and Native communities and to generate more resonant reme-
dial options.
IV. CASE STUDY: THE WAIAHOLE WATER CONTROVERSY
"AIa i hea ka wai a Kane?" Where are the waters of life?
So begins the ancient Native Hawaiian chant that explains, in
Homeric detail, the place of water in Hawaiian society. Re-
sponding to its opening question, the chant names various
points of Hawaiian geography and other physical locations such
as the streams and the clouds.233 As the chant unfolds, how-
232. Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) (de-
scribing a praxis that integrates progressive race theory developments with front-
line justice practice).
233. See Interviews with Ho'oipo Kalaena'auao Pa, in Honolulu, Haw. (Mar.
15 & 18, 2000) (on file with author); Interviews with Moses Nahono Haia, in
Honolulu, Haw. (Feb. 22-23, 2000) (on file with author) (Pa and Haia served as
co-counsel representing Native Hawaiian interests in the Waiahole Ditch case);
Interview with Denise Antolini, supra note 231 (Antolini, as attorney for the Si-
erra Club LDF along with the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation, represented
both environmental and Native Hawaiian interests in the Waiahole Ditch case);
Interview with Aimoku Pali, in Honokohau, Maui, Haw. (Oct. 10, 1997) (on file
with author) (discussing taro farming, water, and Hawaiian community struc-
ture). See generally Elizabeth Ann Ho'opipo Kalaena'auao Pa Martin, et a]., Cul-
tures in Conflict in Hawaii: The Law and Politics of Native Hawaiian Water
Rights, 18 HAW. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing Hawai'i water law and native Ha-
waiians traditional and customary rights in water); LILIKALA KAME'ELE[HIWA,
NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA E PONO A? (1992) (describing
traditional Hawaiian metaphors for land and human connections to it). This
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
ever, both speaker and listener meet in mutual recognition that
in spite of the endless list of places and spaces, the water is ac-
tually nowhere in particular. The water is everywhere.
"Aia i hea ka wai a Kane" has served as a rallying cry for a
cross-cultural coalition of Native Hawaiians, family farmers,
and environmentalists engaged in a pitched battle against his-
torically dominant white agribusinesses over the limited water
resources on the island of Oahu, Hawai'i.234 This battle is an
environmental justice controversy that would not be so charac-
terized by the established environmental justice framework.
Why is this the case?
The conflict began in 1916, when the Waiahole Water Co.
Ltd., a subsidiary of O'ahu Sugar Co., opened the Waiahole
Ditch Tunnel.235 The Ditch diverted almost all of the twenty-
seven million gallons of water per day drawn from windward
(wet side) O'ahu streams to leeward (dry side) O'ahu in order to
irrigate the fertile sugar cane lands owned by agribusiness. 36
The diversion of water devastated the cultural and economic
life of many Native Hawaiian windward residents.237 It de-
stroyed aquatic estuaries, native wildlife, and plant species and
threatened the traditional life of indigenous Hawaiian commu-
nities in the valleys.23 Many Hawaiians moved out of the val-
leys and into towns in order to survive. The leeward landown-
ers, on the other hand, prospered from the diversion,
part's descriptions of Hawaiian culture are drawn from accounts of Native Ha-
waiian scholars, attorneys and cultural practitioners. Co-author Yamamoto is a
Japanese American from Hawai'i; co-author Wong Lyman is of part-Chinese
American and of part-Hawaiian ancestry, also from Hawai'i.
234. See In the Matter of Water Use Permit Applications, Petitions for In-
terim Instream Flow Standard Amendments, and Petition for Water Reservations
for the Waiahole Ditch Combined Contested Case Hearing, 2000 WL 1193271
(Hawai'i) (hereinafter "Waiahole Ditch").
235. See Patricia Tummons, Liquid Assets, HONOLULU WEEKLY, Nov. 9,
1994, at 3 (providing a brief history of the Waiahole Ditch system).
236. See id. at 4; see also LAWRENCE FUCHS, HAWAI'I PONO (1961) (describ-
ing the "Big Five" oligarchy that ruled Hawai'i from 1900 until the late 1950s).
See generally Peter Wagner, On Tap: A Sticky Battle For Old Waiahole's Water,
THE HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Sept. 16, 1995, at Al.
237. See Tummons, supra note 235, at 4.
238. See Videotape: Stolen Waters (Native Hawaiian Advisory Council 1995)
(on file with the author) (describing the impact the ditch had on the windward
residents).
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benefitting from vast agricultural and urban growth on the
leeward plain.239
Today, the sugar industry is practically finished and a bat-
tle ensues for control over the diverted windward valley water.
The issue is whether any or all of the twenty-seven million
gallons of water that the Waiahole Ditch transported to the
leeward side will be returned permanently to the windward
valley streams. Battle lines have been drawn at the State
Commission on Water Resource Management, where large
landowners, state agriculturalists, windward farmers, Native
Hawaiians, and environmentalists have petitioned for control
of the water.24 °
The Waiahole Ditch controversy is about more than the
control of one water source on a single island. For leeward
landowners, this case is about contract and vested rights
claims to the water.24' Environmentalists are concerned about
clean water, habitat restoration, and endangered species pro-
tection. The emerging media narrative portrays a stark black
and white controversy: an economic choice of enhancing the
tourism-dependent state economy through diversified agricul-
ture versus wasting water for a few windward farmers, Native
Hawaiian groups, and environmentalists.242
The controversy has particular resonance for Native Ha-
waiians, in whose existence water occupies a central place.
Without water, traditional Hawaiian agriculture, religion, and
culture cannot survive. A lack of water means the end of Ha-
waiians as a distinct people.243 More specifically, the Native
239. See Robbie Dingeman, Cayetano Supports Leeward, THE HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Dec. 16, 1996, at Al (supporting the leeward position to get most of
the water from the Waiahole Ditch system to increase agriculture and urban
growth).
240. Contested case hearings on the issue began in June 1995 and ended on
September 20, 1996. The commission issued its proposed findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, decision, and order on July 15, 1997. Ultimately, the Commis-
sion's proposed decision restored 16.76 million gallons of water to the windward
streams. This controversy, however, has not ended and the final decision will
most likely be appealed to the Hawai'i Supreme Court.
241. See Alan M. Oshima, Windward Water: Where Should it Go?, THE
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Oct. 6, 1996, at B1.
242. See Dingeman, Cayetano Supports Leeward, supra note 239.
243. See Kekuni Blaisdell, Water Diversion is "Genocide," THE HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, May 30, 1998, at A31 "The oli (chants) and ipu (gourds) declared
that kalo (taro) is our hiapo (elder sibling), Haloa, who feeds us. Without Wai
(water) and 'aina (land), we have no kalo. And, therefore, we kanaka maoli (Na-
tive Hawaiians) perish as a distinct people and nation." Id.
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Hawaiians remaining in the valley, and those who have re-
turned, are attempting to engage in traditional taro farming.
Taro growing, around which communal life in Hawaiian valleys
was historically organized and which provides a potato-like
staple in the Hawaiian diet, depends on a steady flow of fresh,
cool water.
Together, these dimensions of the Waiahole Ditch contro-
versy raise complex issues of environmental justice-issues not
fully comprehended by the established environmental justice
framework. The controversy is partially about the imposition
of disproportionate environmental burdens on relatively poor
communities. Thus, to the extent that the controversy centers
on the effects of water diversion and corresponding environ-
mental degradation on Native Hawaiians, the Waiahole water
dispute generally fits the established environmental racism
model.
The Waiahole Water controversy, however, is also about
something much more. It is about the environment and its
connections to Hawai'i's indigenous peoples. It is about past
and present group-based wrongs and future political and cul-
tural survival. It is a controversy that cannot be understood
without confronting the influence of whiteness in the coloniza-
tion of Hawai'i, beginning in the early 1800s and culminating
in the U.S. annexation of Hawai'i in 1898.244 In brief, the agri-
businesses that acquired vast lands on the leeward plain were
part of the American expansionist movement that first brought
Christianity to Hawai'i. This movement replaced indigenous,
communal notions of landholding with western property law
principles based on private ownership, and then illegally over-
threw Hawai'i's reigning sovereign (with the aid of the U.S.
Minister to Hawai'i, armed marines, and a warship) and "ac-
quired" the former Hawaiian government's lands (later ceded
to the United States). The agribusinesses diverted the water
from the windward valleys to the leeward plain to further what
can be fairly described as white colonial economic interests-in
244. See Yamamoto & lijima, supra note 205 (describing a brief history of
U.S. colonization of Hawai'i); see also THE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK (Melody
Mackenzie ed., 1993); TOM COFFMAN, NATION WITHIN: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S
ANNEXATION OF THE NATION OF HAWAI'I (1998).
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derogation of Native Hawaiian communal, economic, and spiri-
tual interests.245
Fully explored through the racialized environmental jus-
tice method described earlier, the Waiahole Water controversy
emerges as a case about race, sovereignty, economic self-
sufficiency, and cultural restoration-an expansive, group-
resonant type of environmental justice. That method leads us
first to look at Native Hawaiians not as an encompassing racial
group but as a highly differentiated indigenous community.
That assessment in turn leads to important cultural, political,
and spiritual distinctions.
Native Hawaiian culture has a close relationship with the
physical and natural environment. The land, waters, and liv-
ing things that make up the environment are integral compo-
nents of Native Hawaiian social, cultural, and spiritual life
governed by the principle of malama 'aina-caring for the land.
More important, water is a powerful symbol of life:
He hue wai ola ke kanaka na Kane.
Water is life and Kane (man) is the keeper of water.246
Water determines work roles, political allegiances, human
relationships, and legal obligations. Without it, Native Ha-
waiians cannot fish and gather native species central to their
diet. Native Hawaiians also cannot grow taro, the staple that
anchors not only their diet, but also their form of social organi-
zation. For Native Hawaiians, taro has a spiritual, cultural,
political, and economic dimension. Legend has it that the taro
plant is the elder brother of the Hawaiian race.247 Part of the
Hawaiian renaissance is returning the Native people to the
245. See generally HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER (rev.
ed. 1999).
246. MARY K. PUKUI, OLELO NO'EAU: HAWAIIAN PROVERBS AND POETICAL
SAYINGS 68 (1983).
247. See Interviews with Pa and Haia, supra note 233; Interview with
Kunani Nihipali, in Honolulu, Haw. (Nov. 1998) (on file with author) (discussing
taro farming, water, and Hawaiian spirituality); see generally KAME'ELEIHIWA,
supra note 233; Daviana MacGregor, Kupa'a I Ka 'Aina: Persistence on the Land
(1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai'i) (on file with the
Hamilton Library, Hawaiian Pacific Collection, University of Hawai'i, Manao);
THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed.,
1991).
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land and growing taro.248 An increase of water in the windward
streams would thus revive a communal practice that brings to-
gether the Native Hawaiian community for taro farming, ca-
maraderie, and conversation.249 A taro farming revival would
also support the community's goal of self-sufficiency by ex-
panding agriculture and protecting the community's integrity
and lifestyle.25 °
Racializing environmental justice reveals Native Hawaiian
interests by inquiring into the historical and contemporary so-
cial influences on Native Hawaiian identity. This means ex-
amining the painful loss of culture Native Hawaiians experi-
enced as a result of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Nation in
1893. This harm goes beyond the loss of the Native Hawaiian
government. The Hawaiian people have also experienced the
ravaging of their families by disease, the loss of their commu-
nal lands, and the prohibition of their cultural practices and
language.2 5' These harms also extend to the racial identity and
cultural existence of Native Hawaiians as they attempt to rem-
edy past wrongs "so that self-governance and self-
determination may be achieved and justice pursued." '252
The non-Hawaiian windward area parties to the Waiahole
water controversy focused on the "physical" environment: the
windward stream and estuary ecosystem. They relied on con-
ventional environmental rules and remedies, most importantly,
the public trust doctrine.2"' The logic of the public trust doc-
248. See Curt Sanburn, Waiahole: The Triumph of Community, HONOLULU
WEEKLY, Jan. 25, 1995, at 4 (describing the cultural and economic significance of
returning to the land and reviving economic self-sufficiency for the native Ha-
waiian communities in Waiahole Valley).
249. See id.
250. See id. at 5.
251. See Isaac Moriwake, Critical Excavations: Law, Narrative, and the De-
bate on Native American and Hawaiian Cultural Property Repatriation, 20 U.
HAW. L. REV. 261 (1998) (describing the difficulties of reclaiming Hawaiian cul-
tural property).
252. Becky Ashizawa, Church Apologized for Overthrow Role, THE
HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Jan. 18, 1993, at A6 (quoting the Reverend Dr. Paul
Sherry, national president of the United Church of Christ).
253. The public trust doctrine has received increasing attention as a theo-
retical basis for conservation-oriented natural resource management. See gener-
ally DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LAND,
WATER AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL STATES (1990); JACK H. ARCHER
ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S
COASTS (1994); M. Casey Jarman & Richard McLaughlin, A Higher Public Pur-
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trine initially appeared to work in favor of the windward par-
ties, including Native Hawaiians. During its six month ad-
ministrative hearing, the Water Commission ordered tempo-
rary restoration of ten million gallons per day to windward
valley streams.
For some Native Hawaiians, however, the public trust doc-
trine seemed to pose more questions than answers. First, the
prominence of the public trust arguments tended to over-
shadow even the traditional environmental justice issue in the
case-the historical and continuing inequitable distribution of
natural resources and environmental burdens. Second, those
arguments, although bringing temporary and partial benefit to
Native Hawaiians, also tended to limit scrutiny of the "social"
(or racial) environmental issues and the depth of the Native
Hawaiian claims.
Racializing the environmental justice dimension of the
Waiahole water controversy reveals a host of questions about
the traditional public trust approach advanced by the non-
Hawaiian windward advocates. Would the Commission (or
later the court) employ the doctrine without reference to Native
Hawaiian concerns? What do the terms "public" and "trust"
really mean? Would the public trust doctrine, with its larger
public good emphasis, undermine more specialized Hawaiian
rights to water and traditional agricultural practices? Would
the doctrine demand the preservation of the stream ecosystems
to the detriment of Native Hawaiian communal interests?
Would the use of the public trust doctrine within the state legal
system foreclose Native Hawaiian claims based on Hawaiian
political sovereignty? Would the public trust ignore deeply
held cultural beliefs of indigenous Hawaiians about nature as
family rather than as trust res or property? Would arguing be-
pose? The Constitutionality of Mississippi's Public Trust Tidelands Legislation, 11
Miss. C. L. REV. 5 (1990). At the core of the doctrine lies the notion that, apart
from any private property rights (jus privatum) in land or natural resources, the
state holds an interest in certain publicly important lands (jus publicum) for the
"higher good" of the general citizenry. The public trust doctrine features four cen-
tral elements. "Public" refers to the collective body of people or citizens covered by
the doctrine. "Trust" invokes the concept of a duty, a relationship of care or
guardianship enjoyed by this collectivity. In addition to the body politic and the
duty, the compound concept of the "public trust" involves two more elements: the
governing authority subject to the public trust and the res, or thing protected by
the doctrine.
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fore the "courts of the conqueror"254 get Native Hawaiians, as
distinct from the non-Native Hawaiian windward parties, any-
where at all? Would a state-controlled public trust provide Na-
tive Hawaiians a remedy they desire?
The racializing environmental justice approach-and par-
ticularly the concepts of differential racialization and
empowerment-leads us to ask these questions. For many Na-
tive Hawaiians, the controversy is about their spiritual and
economic connections to the environment. It is also about cul-
tural resurrection and political nationalism. 5  Racializing en-
vironmental justice provides a framework for this kind of
analysis and it shapes how we view the "environmental" prob-
lem, the rights claims, and the possible "justice" remedies.
In August 2000, the Hawai'i Supreme Court issued its
ruling in the Waiahole water controversy, affirming in part and
reversing in part the Water Commission's decision.256 As advo-
cated by the windward parties, the court based its legal frame-
work for water resource protection on the public trust doctrine.
The court, however, significantly reconceptualized the doctrine
in terms of indigenous peoples' rights. Building on prior deci-
sions identifying the public trust as a residual aspect of Ha-
waiian Kingdom law ensuring the rights of "the people" to wa-
ter, the court stated, "In acknowledging the general public's
need for water, we do not lose sight of the trust's original in-
tent."21 7 Looking at history and traditional Hawaiian culture,
the court identified that original intent as the "preservation of
the rights of native tenants during the transition to a western
system of private property."255  The court, therefore, vowed to
"continue to uphold the exercise of Native Hawaiian rights as a
public trust purpose," among others. 9
The Hawai'i court's framing of the public trust doctrine is
an historic first step toward broadening public understanding
and regarding the complex physical and social environmental
issues. As highlighted by an analysis that racializes environ-
254. See Williams, supra note 146.
255. See Interviews with Pa and Haia, supra note 233; Robbie Dingeman,
Windward Demanding Return of Flow Lost to Waiahole Ditch, THE HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Dec. 16, 1996, at Al; Trask, supra note 245.
256. See Waiahole Ditch, supra note 234.
257. Id. at 23.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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mental justice, that new framing is also a first step toward ex-
plicitly integrating indigenous peoples' environmental interests
into the public trust calculus and, indeed, into a more encom-
passing conception of environmental justice.
CONCLUSION
Racializing environmental justice goes beyond treating
race as fixed and biological. It acknowledges the construction
of race and racial categories through politics and culture. It
also entails expanding environmental justice to recognize that
each racial group is differently situated according to its specific
socio-economic needs, political power, cultural values, and
group goals. In doing so, racializing environmental justice en-
ables scholars and activists to better grapple with varying
forms of subordination and to tailor specific remedies for the
harms that are specific to each racial community.
The preliminary analysis of the Waiahole Ditch contro-
versy illustrated aspects of this approach to racializing envi-
ronmental justice by highlighting the complexity of racial and
Native peoples' issues in an attempt to characterize claims and
fashion remedies addressing the specific needs of the particular
communities.
The earlier discussion of the R.LS.E. case illuminated
other aspects of the approach. It revealed the district court's
limited, perhaps myopic, view of the racialized nature of the
siting decision. The court acknowledged the "disparate impact
on African American communities" (measured against
whites).26 ° But without examining the economic, cultural, or
spiritual impacts on the specific African American communi-
ties, the court found that the decisionmaking board did not in-
tend to discriminate and "balanced the economic, environ-
mental, and cultural needs of the County in a responsible and
conscientious manner."
2 61
Examination of the R.I.S.E case also revealed the "bi-
racial," non-profit advocacy group's initial focus on traditional
environmental harms such as pollution, traffic, and noise. For
the group's predominantly white leadership, it appears, racial
community harms were largely an afterthought. The district
260. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991).
261. Id.
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court found, dismissively, that "[r]ace discrimination did not
become a significant public issue until it appeared that the ini-
tial [environmental] thrust was failing."262
How might the litigation in R.I.S.E have differed, politi-
cally and legally, had the controversy been conceptualized from
the outset not as a pollution/noise/traffic problem? What if it
had instead been conceived as continuing subordination of a
particular African American community in the South, for
whom the desecration of its church and communal center,
founded by freed slaves, was a racial act with profound social
and cultural meaning?263 How might the cross-racial alliance
have been more effectively forged? How might the public's un-
derstanding of the controversy, and other environmental jus-
tice disputes, have differed if the controversy had been differ-
ently conceived and advocated? The racializing environmental
justice approach, offered here in preliminary form, does not de-
finitively answer these tough questions. It does, however, raise
them and suggest points of critical inquiry and analysis.
Not all scholars or practitioners will embrace the racializa-
tion of environmental justice. And further development and re-
finement is needed. This approach urges us, nevertheless, at a
minimum, to begin rethinking the established environmental
justice framework and to begin treating racial and Native
communities and their relationship to the environment with
greater complexity based on each community's cultural, his-
torical, and political experience and its specific needs and
goals. To deal meaningfully with environmental racism, the
environmental justice movement must seriously take account
of race. "[I]n order to treat some persons equally, we must
treat them differently. '264 And in doing so, we might also open
fresh understandings of the interplay between communities
and "the environment."
262. Id. at 1148.
263. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (suggesting a
cultural meaning test for ascertaining "intentional" discrimination); see also Su-
san Kiyomi Serrano, supra note 139, at 221.
264. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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